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APPELLANTS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Mary Day ("Mrs. Day"), by and through her counsel of record, 
Larry R. Keller, Esq., and Craig L. Boorman, Esq., and pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing of 
the Court's opinion entered on September 2, 1994. Mrs. Day seeks a rehearing of the 
issues decided on pages 10-17 of the majority opinion, which specifically involve Mrs. 
Day's open courts, equal protection and due process arguments under the Utah 
Constitution. Mrs. Day also seeks rehearing of the majority decision on page 3 of the 
opinion that the Defendant municipalities and their employee peace officers are not 
negligent as a matter of law. Mrs. Day submits the following points and authorities in 
support of her Petition for Rehearing. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
MRS, DAY'S RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE OPEN COURTS 
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE L SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION ARE VIOLATED IF FORMER U.CA. S 63-30-7(2) IS 
APPLIED TO BAR HER CAUSES OF ACTION, 
Pages 10-16 of the majority opinion address Mrs. Day's arguments under the open 
courts provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. The majority opinion 
concludes that Mrs. Day's rights are not violated because the Utah common law doctrine 
of governmental immunity, as it had developed to the time of Utah's statehood in 1896, 
precluded a cause of action against peace officers for their negligent acts during a high-
speed police chase. The majority opinion therefore holds that no common law right has 
been abrogated if former U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) is applied to bar Mrs. Day's causes of 
action. 
1 
Mrs. Day respectfully submits that the majority opinion has overlooked the 
controlling law in regard to this issue, and misplaced its reliance on early Utah case law 
and other authorities which are inapposite to the specific issue of whether peace officers 
could be sued for their negligent acts in 1896, when Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constituion was adopted. 
The authorities are universally in agreement, and the majority opinion correctly 
points out, that the American common law which developed during the 1800's provided 
judicial and legislative officers with absolute immunity from tort liability, and eventually 
extended qualified immunity to administrative officers for their discretionary acts while 
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.1 
The authorities are also in agreement that the common law, both as it developed in 
the 1800's and throughout the 1900's and up to the present time, has always held that 
peace officers are liable for their negligent acts without regard to any discretionary/ 
ministerial distinctions. Courts have simply not applied discretionary/ministerial 
distinctions, or have classified police action as ministerial.2 The majority opinion on page 
1
 See, e.g., K.C. Davis & R.J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 19.3, at 
209-17 (3d ed. 1994); G.A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort 
Liability, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 1175, 1176-78 (1977); F. James, Jr., Tort Liability of 
Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.Chi.L.Rev. 610, 635-42 (1955); W.P. 
Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 132 (5th ed. 1984); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 895D (1965); L.L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: 
Damage Actions, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 209, 218-22 (1963). Several of these authorites are 
cited and relied upon by the majority on pages 10-13 of the majority opinion. 
2
 See, e.g., Davis & Pierce, supra note 1, at 217; Keeton, et al., supra note 1, at 
1056, 1062-63; Jaffe, supra note 1, at 218-19; W.C. Mathes & R.T. Jones, Toward a 
"Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 Geo.LJ. 
889, 894-99 (1965); K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 26.03, at 520-21 (1958); 
Annotations, Personal Liability of Peace Officer or His Bond for Negligence Causing 
Personal Injury or Death, 18 A.L.R. 197 (1922) and 39 A.L.R. 1306 (1925); Annotation, 
Personal Liability of Policeman, Sheriff, or Other Peace Officer, or Bond, for Negligently 
2 
13 appears to recognize that the common law did not extend immunity for discretionary 
acts to torts committed by police officers, particularly in the course of making an arrest.3 
It is very clear that peace officers, especially when attempting to effect an arrest, have 
never been accorded the same immunity under the common law as accorded to judicial, 
legislative and administrative officers. 
Thus, the critical question for purposes of the instant case, is whether Utah common 
and statutory law applied the foregoing common law rules at the time of statehood in 
1896, and held peace officers liable for their negligent acts, irrespective of any 
discretionary/ministerial distinction. On page 13, the majority opinion states that "the 
parties have not cited any Utah case law from near the time of statehood which 
addresses immunity for police officers, and we have not found any." Mrs. Day 
respectfully submits that there are in fact early decisions by the Utah Supreme Court 
which definitively establish that Utah law followed the general American common law 
rules which held peace officers liable for their negligent acts. Mrs. Day would have 
presented these cases to the Court pursuant to her motions for reargument and to file a 
response to the Defendants' Supplemental Brief, but both of these motions were denied 
by the Court. 
An early Utah case in point, which predates statehood in 1896, is Snell v. Crowe, 3 
Utah 26, 5 P. 522 (1881). In Snell the plaintiff sued the defendant town constable for 
unreasonably excluding plaintiff from his building for several days pursuant to a levy of 
Causing Personal Injury or Death, 60 A.L.R. 2d 873 (1958); 80 C.J.S., Sheriffe and 
Constables § 52; 70 Am.Jur.2d, Sheriffs. Police, and Constables § 90. 
3
 The majority cites Davis & Pierce, supra note 1, at 217; Bermann, supra note 1, 
at 1183-84. 
3 
attachment. The Snell Court held that whether the constable was liable to the plaintiff 
was for the jury to determine, and that it was not error for the trial court to give 
instructions to this effect. 5 P. at 526. The liability of peace officers in similar situations 
has been consistently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.4 
However, the two Utah cases which most directly address the issue of the liability of 
a peace officer for his negligent acts under Utah common law, and which are the most 
analgous to the issue presented by the instant case, are Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227, 
236 P. 220 (1925), and Jackson v. Harries, 65 Utah 282, 236 P. 234 (1925).5 In Geros, 
the plaintiff filed an action against the Salt Lake County Sheriff and two of his deputies 
for injuries suffered by the plaintiff when he was shot by one of the deputy sheriffs 
during the course of searching the plaintiffs restaurant for unlawful intoxicating liquors. 
The Geros Court rejected the argument of the Sheriff and his deputies that they should 
not be liable for their negligent acts or omissions, and held as follows: 
No doubt the officers of the law should receive the protection of the law in 
so far as their acts justify protection. The citizen is, however, equally 
entitled to protection. The law knows no favorites, and an officer, when he 
offends, stands precisely upon the same footing as the citizen. Nor does the 
law justify the condemnation of a citizen when it would not, under the same 
state of facts and under the same quantum of evidence, condemn the acts of 
the officer. In this case, the defendants were given the full protection of the 
law, and in one or two instances they were given more than the strict 
enforcement of the law authorizes. 
4
 See, e ^ Spalding v. Allred, 23 Utah 354, 64 P. 1100, 1102-03 (1901); 
Christensen v. Beebe. 32 Utah 406, 91 P. 129, 132 (1907); Whittler v. Sharp, 43 Utah 
419, 135 P. 112, 115 (1913); Higgs v. Burton, 58 Utah 99, 197 P. 728, 730 (1921); Truitt 
v. Patten, 75 Utah 567, 287 P. 175, 176-77 (1930); Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 
P.2d 242, 249 (1943). 
5
 Geros and Jackson are cited by the 1925 and 1958 A.L.R. Annotations, supra 
note 2, that a peace officer may be held personally liable for negligent or wrongful acts 
causing personal injury or death. In fact, Geros is the subject case of the 1925 A.L.R. 
Annotation. See 39 A.L.R. 1297-1306. 
4 
236 P. at 225 (emphases added). 
In Jackson, the plaintiff instituted an action against the Salt Lake County Sheriff 
and three of his deputies for injuries to plaintiff caused by the negligent use of unusual 
and unnecessary force in executing a search and seizure warrant of plaintiffs private 
residence. Consistent with its holding in Geros, the Jackson Court held as follows: 
Officers, like others, will be protected only so long as they act within the 
law. The evidence is clearly to the effect that the deputy sheriffs used 
unusual and unnecessary force in executing the search and seizure warrant 
which resulted in personal injuries to the plaintiff for which their principal 
and the surety on his official bond are legally liable. 
236 P. at 236-37 (emphasis added). 
The peace officers in Geros and Jackson were clearly exercising their discretion and 
judgment, and were held liable for their negligent acts. Therefore, it is evident that Utah 
common law in effect at the time of statehood would have allowed Mrs. Day's causes of 
action in the instant case. 
Peace officers continued to be liable for their negligence under Utah common law, 
even though they were exercising considerable discretion or judgment, clear up until at 
least the early 1960's. In Benallv v. Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 376 P.2d 388 (1962), the 
widow and daughter of the deceased, who had been fatally injured in a fall down stairs at 
the city jail after being arrested for intoxication, brought an action for wrongful death 
against the arresting officer. The principal point urged on appeal against the arresting 
officer was the refusal of the trial court to allow the case to go to the jury on the issue of 
his negligence. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and 
remanded for a new trial on the issue of the arresting officer's negligence: 
Ordinarily one has no duty to look after the safety of another who has 
become voluntarily intoxicated and thus limited his ability to protect himself. 
But that absence of duty ended when Officer Robinson took Benally into 
5 
custody. It then became his obligation to measure up to the standard of 
conduct which the law almost universally imposes: that of using the degree 
of care and caution which an ordinary reasonable and prudent person would 
use under the circumstances. The deceased was entitled to have degree of 
care observed in his behalf, even though he was drunk. . . . Accordingly, it 
was error for the court to instruct to the effect that the extent of the 
officer's duty was to refrain from intentional injury to the deceased and to 
refuse to instruct upon his full duty to exercise reasonable care for his 
safety. 
376 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
Early Utah territorial law and subsequent statutory law codified parts of the 
common law, and provided that peace officers were liable for their negligent acts.6 Early 
Utah statutory law, which confirms the liability of peace officers for their negligent acts, 
is important because it supersedes any common law rules which may be in conflict 
therewith at the time of statehood.7 Furthermore, it should be pointed out that many of 
the early Utah statutes holding sheriffs and other peace officers liable for their tortious 
6
 See, e ^ , C.L. 1876: pp. 51-52 (§ 1 of 1874 Act of Congress applicable to Utah 
Territory - marshal and deputies and their sureties liable for "mis-feasance" and "non-
feasance"); § 1320 (marshal liable for escape or rescue of arrested defendant); § 2365 
(sheriff liable for safe keeping of his prisoners committed by authority of United States). 
C.L. 1888: § 112 (sheriff or jailer liable for "neglect" to serve judicial paper on prisoner); 
§118 (sheriff liable for safe keeping of prisoners committed by authority of United 
States); § 3145(2) (two-year statute of limitations for action against marshal, sheriff or 
constable acting in official capacity); § 3146(4) (one-year statute of limitations for action 
against marshal, sheriff or other officer for escape of prisoner). R.S. 1898: §§ 549, 578, 
585-589, 3250, 3257, 3492 (liabilities of sheriff and other peace officers in performance of 
their official duties); § 2878(1) (same two-year statute of limitations as in C.L. 1888, § 
3145(2), supra); § 2879(4) (same one-year statute of limitations for escape as in C.L. 
1888, § 3146(4), supra). 
7
 See, Utah Constitution, Art. XXIV § 2 (all Utah territorial laws remain in force 
until they expire by their own limitations, or are altered or repealed by the legislature); 
R.S. 1898 § 2488 (common law is the rule of decision in the courts of Utah unless it is 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or statutes of Utah). 
6 
acts have not changed in a century and are identical to current Utah statutes. 
Utah law, in addition to holding peace officers liable for their negligent acts, has 
maintained a clear distinction between "public officers" and regular governmental 
employees.9 Prior to the 1978 amendments to U.C.A. § 63-30-4, regular governmental 
employees were not accorded discretionary function immunity for their negligent acts. 
See Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah 1977) {employee defendant distinguished 
from a public official for purposes of applying discretionary function immunity ~ 
Sheffield v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968), distinguished on the fact that 
in Sheffield suit was against the warden of the Utah State Prison, and not an employee); 
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers. 743 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1987) (doctors as governmental 
employees had no immunity from suit for their simple negligence at common law). It is 
also very significant to note that within a matter of a few months after Cornwall was 
decided in October of 1977, the Utah legislature amended U.C.A. § 63-30-4 in 1978 to 
give all governmental employees, including peace officers, immunity from suit for their 
negligent acts or omissions. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis of Utah common and statutory law at the time of 
statehood, and for many decades thereafter, it is apparent that Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 
8
 See, e ^ , U.C.A. §§ 17-22-6, 17-22-13 thru 18 (liabilities of sheriff); U.C.A. §§ 
78-12-28(1) and 78-12-29(5) (statutes of limitation for actions against peace officers). 
9
 See, e ^ , Utah Constitution, Art. VI §§ 17-21 (impeachment of officersV, Art. 
XIII, § 8 (public officers - punishment for misusing public monies); Art. IV, § 10 (oath 
of office for elected and appointed officersV, U.C.A. § 77-5-1 et seq. (impeachment of 
officersV, U.C.A. § 77-6-1 et seq. (removal from office of officers not liable to 
impeachment); U.CA. §§ 76-8-101(1), 77-la-l(l), 63-30-2(2), 67-16-3(12), 67-16-3(13) 
(definitions which distinguish a "public officer" from a "public employee" or "peace 
officer."). 
7 
102, 86 P. 772 (1906), and the other Utah cases cited and relied upon in the majority 
opinion, are not controlling. Mrs. Day respectfully submits that the majority opinion has 
misplaced its reliance on Garff and the other cited cases, which simply apply the 
American and Utah common law rules that administrative officers are not liable for their 
discretionary acts while exercising quasi-judicial functions. Garff clearly involved the 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions of an administrative official, a deputy state sheep 
inspector, and the Garff Court clearly delineated this fact. 86 P. at 774. In support of 
its holding that the sheep inspector was not liable for his negligent discretionary acts, the 
Court cites 15 cases as authority. Id. Every one of these 15 cases address the 
discretionary function immunity of judicial legislative or administrative officers — not 
one of these cases involves the liability of a peace officer.10 The 1845 and 1896 U.S. 
Supreme Court cases of Kendall v. Stokes and Spalding v. Vilas involve the Postmaster 
General, and have universally been cited by authorites for the common law rule that 
administrative officers are immune from suit when exercising discretionary functions. 
Other very early Utah cases, like Garff, applied the common law rule that judicial. 
10
 The cases cited in Garff and the particular type of public officer(s) involved are 
as follows: People v. Bartels. 138 111. 322, 27 N.E. 1091 (1891) (Clerk of Probate Court); 
State v. Meier, 143 Mo. 439, 45 S.W. 306 (1898) (President of City Council); Grider v. 
Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 54 Am.Rep. 65 (1884) (Probate Judge); Fath v. Koeppel, 72 Wis. 289, 
39 N.W. 539 (1888) (City Meat Inspector); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) 
(Postmaster General); Chamberlain v. Clayton, 56 Iowa 331, 9 N.W. 237 (1881) (Trustees 
of Institution for Deaf and Dumb); Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228 (1867) (Supervisor of 
Township Board); Bailey v. Berkev, 81 F. 737 (C.C., N.D. Cal. 1897) (County Assessor); 
Ballerino v. Mason, 83 Cal. 447, 23 P. 530 (1890) (County Assessor); Pike v. Megoun, 44 
Mo. 491 (1869) (Voter Registration Officers); State v. Thomas, 88 Tenn. 491, 12 S.W. 
1034 (1890) (ex officio State Insurance Commissioner); Schooler v. Arlington, 106 Mo. 
App. 607, 81 S.W. 468 (1904) (County Bridge Commissioner); State v. Hastings, 37 Neb. 
96, 55 N.W. 774 (1893) (members of Board of Public Lands and Buildings); Kendall v. 
Stokes, 3 How. (U.S.) 87 (1845) (Postmaster General); Daniels v. Hathaway, 65 Vt. 247, 
26 A. 970 (1893) (Town Selectmen). 
8 
legislative or administrative officers, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, were 
immune for their negligent discretionary acts.11 
All of the other much more recent Utah cases relied upon by the majority opinion 
do not involve peace officers, but rather involve administrative officers exercising quasi-
judicial functions.12 These cases and Garff are simply inapposite to the specific issue of 
whether or not Mrs. Day had a cause of action in Utah in 1896 against employee peace 
officers for their negligent acts. Mrs. Day respectfully submits these cases are not 
controlling and the majority opinion has misplaced its reliance on them. The controlling 
Utah cases are Snell v. Crowe, Geros v. Harries, Jackson v. Harries, and Benallv v. 
Robinson, supra, which clearly stand for the proposition that peace officers were liable 
for their negligent discretionary acts in 1896 and for over sixty years thereafter. 
Therefore, Mrs. Day respectfully submits that the majority opinion's application of 
former U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) to bar her causes of action in the instant case, violates her 
rights guaranteed by the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution.13 
11
 See, e ^ , Salt Lake County v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P. 1075 (1911) (liability 
of county commissioners). 
12
 See Hiorth v. Whittenberg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952) (State Road 
Commissioners); Sheffield v. Turner, supra (Warden of State Prison); Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) (Commissioner of State Department of Financial 
Institutions). See also Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 P.2d 1085 (1935) (Board of 
County Commissioners and State Tax Commission members); Utah State University v. 
Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) (University officials and Institutional Council 
members); Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984) (County Commissioners and 
County Clerk Auditor); Spruell v. Snyder, 693 P.2d 66 (Utah 1984) (Mayor and City 
Council members). 
13
 The court is referred to Point I of Mrs. Day's Reply Brief and Point II of her 
Opening Brief. In addition to the cases and authorities cited therein, the Court is 
referred to the recent case of Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993). 
9 
POINT II 
MRS. DAY'S RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE h SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION ARE VIOLATED IF FORMER U.CA. S 63-30-7(2) IS 
APPLIED TO BAR HER CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Subpoint 4 of page 16 of the majority opinion holds that Mrs. Day's rights to equal 
protection under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution are not violated by 
application of former U.CA. § 63-30-7(2) to bar her causes of action, based upon the 
majority's legal conclusion that Mrs. Day had no cause of action under Utah common 
law at the time of statehood to sue a peace officer for his negligent acts during a high-
speed police chase.. Thus, the majority concludes that Mrs. Day did not have any rights 
protected by the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, 
and therefore the majority opinion appies the traditional "rational basis" test and the 
presumption of constitutionality to rule that Mrs. Day's rights to equal protection are 
also not violated. 
Based upon the arguments set forth in Point I of this Petition, supra, Mrs. Day 
respectfully requests the Court to reexamine its equal protection ruling. Since Mrs. Day 
did have a cause of action under Utah law at the time of statehood, and her rights under 
the open courts provisions of the Utah Constitution have been violated, the presumption 
of constitutionality does not attach to former section 63-30-7(2), the burden of proof is 
shifted to the Defendants to establish its constitutionality, and the "heightened scrutiny" 
test should be applied by this Court in its equal protection analysis. See Lee v. Gaufin, 
supra; Condemarin v. University Hospital 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989); Malan v. Lewis. 693 
P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
It is clear from the foregoing Utah Supreme Court decisions that former section 63-
10 
30-7(2) cannot pass "heightened scrutiny" analysis, and the Defendants have completely 
failed to meet their burden of proof to justify the passage of this section and establish its 
constitutionality.14 
Moreover, notwithstanding application of the traditional rational basis test, former 
section 63-30-7(2) violates Mrs. Day's rights to equal protection because it operated to 
discriminate against individuals injured in police pursuit situations as opposed to all 
other individuals injured in other police emergency situations and other emergency 
situations involving fire, paramedic and ambulance vehicles. Former section 63-30-7(2) 
thus created and singled out a separate class of individuals without any rational 
justification. This is precisely the type of discrimination prohibited by Article I, Section 
24 of the Utah Constitution, even under the traditional rational basis analysis. See Lee, 
Condemarin. and Malan, supra. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Day has established from the legislative history of former section 
63-30-7(2), that it was enacted based upon misinformation and untrue statements, and to 
address a phantom crisis of a "rash of frivolous lawsuits" which has never, at any time, 
past or present, existed in the State of Utah.15 Therefore, since enactment of former 
section 63-30-7(2) had no rational relationship to its legislatively stated purpose of 
protecting government coffers from frivolous lawsuits arising from high-speed police 
pursuits, Mrs. Day's equal protection rights have been violated, even under the 
traditional rational basis test. See Lee, Condemarin, and Malan, supra. 
Therefore, Mrs. Day respectfully submits that her rights guaranteed by the equal 
14
 Mrs. Day would refer the Court to Points II.A and III of her Opening Brief, 
and Point II of her Reply Brief. 
15
 The Court is referred to Point II.A, pp. 15-23, of Mrs. Day's Opening Brief. 
11 
protection provisions of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution are violated if 
former U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) is applied to bar her causes of action. 
POINT III 
MRS. DAY'S RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE DUE PROCESS 
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARE VIOLATED IF FORMER U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) IS APPLIED TO BAR HER 
CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Although subparagraph 4 on page 16 of the majority opinion is entitled "Equal 
Protection and Due Process," the entire discussion which follows is confined to an equal 
protection analysis. Thus, the majority opinion does not directly address Mrs. Day's due 
process arguments.16 Based upon the arguments set forth in Point I of this Petition, 
supra, Mrs. Day respectfully requests that the Court reexamine its conclusion that Mrs. 
Day's due process rights have not been violated. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding a ruling by this Court that Mrs. Day's rights under the 
open courts provisions of the Utah Constitution have not been violated, Mrs. Day 
respectfully submits that her due process rights are still violated if former section 63-30-
7(2) is applied to bar her causes of action. Application of this section to bar Mrs. Day's 
suit makes Mrs. Day not only the only person in Utah, but also the only person on the 
face of the earth, who will ever be affected by the governmental immunity provisions of 
this section. Fundamental fairness is the cornerstone of due process of law. It would be 
difficult to imagine a more fundamentally unfair application of a state law to an 
individual, especially to one of its own residents. 
Former section 63-30-7(2) was only in effect for one year and six days. The act 
16
 The Court is referred to Point IV of Mrs. Day's Opening Brief and Point II of 
her Reply Brief. 
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which repealed it was passed by both houses of the legislature approximately three weeks 
before the devastating accident which killed Mrs. Day's husband and permanently injured 
Mrs. Day. Moreover, the repealing act was signed and approved by the Governor four 
days before the accident. However, because the repealing act contained a stated 
effective date of approximately five and a half weeks after the accident, Mrs. Day has 
been singled out as the only person to ever be barred from suit under former section 63-
30-7(2). 
This is fundamentally unfair, and if allowed to stand will result in another immense 
personal tragedy to Mrs. Day. She will not even get her day in court to seek 
compensation and redress for the tragic death of her husband and her own serious 
personal injuries caused by the negligence of the Defendants in this case. Therefore, 
Mrs. Day respectfully submits that her rights guaranteed by the due process provisions of 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution are violated if former U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) is 
applied to bar her causes of action. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ARE NOT IMMUNE 
FROM SUIT UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION IN 
U.C.A. 8 63-30-10(1). 
The majority opinion states on page 15 that its holding "does not address whether 
Trooper Colyar's actions were discretionary or ministerial under any version of Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act or cases decided thereunder." Mrs. Day respectfully 
submits that this issue must now be directly addressed and ruled upon by the Court. 
The majority opinion cites Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 
(Utah 1983); and Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980); as examples of relevant cases 
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which address the discretionary/ministerial function issue under U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1). 
Little and Frank, along with other decisions by the Utah Supreme Court,17 clearly 
establish that the Defendant peace officers' actions in the instant case, as well as those of 
the other as yet unnamed employee defendants, were implemental or operational in 
nature, and therefore ministerial functions under section 63-30-10(l).18 
Therefore, Mrs. Day respectfully submits that the Defendant governmental entities 
in the instant case are not immune from suit under the discretionary function exception 
in U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1), and that this Court must now make a direct ruling on this issue. 
POINT V 
LACK OF CAUSATION BY THE DEFENDANT MUNICIPALITIES AND 
THEIR EMPLOYEES CANNOT PROPERLY BE DETERMINED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, 
The majority opinion rules on page 3 that the City Defendants cannot be liable 
because Floyd, the fleeing suspect, "simply went around the municipal officers' vehicles, 
did not see them again after passing them prior to the collision, and was attempting at 
all times during the pursuit to elude only Trooper Colyar." 
Mrs. Day respectfully submits that this is an inappropriate analysis of causation 
17
 See, e^, Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977); Doe v. Arguelles. 716 
P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Irvine v. Salt Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989). 
18
 The Court is referred to Point V of Mrs. Day's Opening Brief and Point III of 
her Reply Brief. The Court is also referred to pp. 16-21 of "Appellees' Supplemental 
Brief submitted by Defendants, in which the Defendants themselves admit and establish 
that clear Utah law, as well as federal law under the Federal Tort Claims Act, holds that 
the actions of the peace officers in the instant case are ministerial under the 
governmental immunity provisions making governmental entities liable for the negligent 
acts of their employees. 
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under Utah law, and asks this Court to reconsider its decision on this issue.19 
Therefore, Mrs. Day respectfully requests the Court to reconsider its ruling 
upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the City Defendants, based 
upon lack of causation as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Mrs. Day respectfully requests that this Court 
grant her Petition for Rehearing, and that the majority reconsider its rulings as set forth 
in the foregoing arguments of this Petition. 
1
 The Court is referred to Point VI of Mrs. Day's Opening Brief, and Point IV of 
her Reply Brief. Of particular importance and direct relevance are Brown v. Citv of 
Pinellas Park. 557 So.2d 161 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1990); Bover v. State. 594 A.2d 121 (Md. 
1991); Fiser v. Citv of Ann Arbor. 339 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. 1983). These three cases are 
cited and discussed on pp. 43-44 of Mrs. Day's Opening Brief. 
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